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MUNICIPAL LAW. By Charles S. Rhyne. Washington: The National In-
stitute of Municipal Law Officers, 1957. Pp. xxi, 1125. $22.50.
To those who have long nurtured a wistful desire for a portable treatise
in the law of municipal corporations,' the publication of Charles S. Rhyne's
Municipal Law was a welcome event. There has been a need for a con-
cise reference book in this area. His long and rich experience with the
everyday legal problems of municipalities makes Mr. Rhyne a logical au-
thor of such a book, and certainly the National Institute of Municipal Law
Officers (NIMLO), as national clearinghouse for information from city
and town attorneys, is the logical patron for the venture.
In its conciseness and coverage, Municipal Law is little short of remark-
able, deserving some variant of that currently-popular expression of in-
credulity, "Who put all those great big tomatoes in that little bitty can?"
In 1125 pages, 145 of which are devoted to a highly proliferated index, the
author has covered a very large range of municipal problems, including
special chapters on parking, airports, urban renewal, and extraterritorial
powers. About half the space allotted to the text of the book is taken up
by citations to an estimated 20,000 cases, a feat made possible by the
arrangement of case materials in alphabetical order by state, with the name
of the reporter printed in bold face, thus: 116 Iowa 96, eliminating the
space required to indent and label separately the precedents from each ju-
risdiction, and at the same time providing the reader relatively easy identifi-
cation of cases from his own state.
Municipal Law is organized for the "daily use" of the municipal attorney,
and the effort has been made to separate for special treatment complexes
of problems which are most likely to demand such an attorney's attention.
If the city toys with the idea of constructing an airport, for instance, the
municipal attorney will wish to instruct himself on the methods of acquir-
ing property usually outside the geographical limits of the corporation,
the powers of the corporation to control such property, its taxability and
liability to special assessments-in short "all about airports." Where the
city is planning an urban renewal project, the municipal attorney must learn
"all about urban renewal." This type of organization is apt to be repeti-
tious, however, unless very carefully cross-referenced, and it is apt to be
contradictory unless very carefully edited. In Municipal Law, there are
many examples of repetition, and if none of the statements are outright
contradictory, at the very least some are difficult to reconcile. In the chap-
ter on extraterritorial powers and relations, it is stated that the better
reasoned and majority rule is that, "the property of one municipality lo-
cated within the boundaries of another municipality in the same state is
exempt from taxation if used for a public purpose, unless made taxable by
express legislation." But in the chapter on taxation without cross-refer-
iLThough not quite so long as the publisher of Municipal Law would have us be-
lieve. On its dust cover, MunioipaZ Law is hailed as the "first one-volume handbook
on municipal law since 1910." Ordinarily, it would be unfair to note the excesses
of dust covers. This reviewer finds it droll, however, that among NIMLO's "unique
municipal law source materials" they did not locate a copy of Cooley's 1914 horn-
book, Municipa orporations.
2 P. 314.
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ence of any kind, it is stated, that, "in determining exemption from taxation,
ownership is the test applied to property held by the United States, the
state or its political subdivisions, but use for purposes enumerated in the
exemption provision is the test for other exemptions granted by general
law." 3 In the chapter on municipal property, it is stated, that, "municipal
properties which courts have held to be used for governmental purposes and
thus not subject to sale in the absence of legislative authority include
. . . "a municipal utility . . . ., 4 In the chapter on municipally-
owned utilities, on the other hand, it is said that, "in the absence of statu-
tory authority, a city may not sell its waterworks . . . However, a
city may sell its natural gas plant," 5 and "municipally owned utilities are
considered to be 'public utilities' and in general, to be held by a municipality
in its proprietary capacity as private utility companies hold property, rather
than in its governmental capacity." 6
The volume has another and, in the opinion of this reviewer, a much
more fundamental foible. The traditional method of writing one-volume
treatises is to reduce current majority doctrine into short textual statements,
noting in the footnotes the qualifications, exceptions, and areas of apostacy.
This method lends itself best to rubrics characterized by common-law de-
velopment or by uniform legislation where the courts deal with matters
with a common case heritage or with largely the same statutory language.
In municipal law, every effort to identify current doctrine and delimit its
boundaries is met with the necessity for the close examination of the state
constitutions, charters, and general and special laws which provide the
context for each decision. It is very rarely possible to say, in the approved
manner of textbook writers, "Absent statute, the rule is .
There is virtually always a statute, usually more than one. judge Cooley
gave recognition to this fact in the preface to his Municipal Corporations: 7
As a very large proportion of this branch of the law is statutory, it is, of
course, impossible, -within the limits of a single volume, to treat the sub-
ject exhaustively or even with an approach to completeness. The aim
has been, rather, to give a clear and concise treatment of those funda-
mental principles which may be and are applied in any attempt to formu-
late and construe the law of municipal corporations as found in the
various statutes.
Mr. Rhyne mentions this complexity but shows no such humility in its face.
He offers the book as "restating the municipal law in use today as revealed
by the nation-wide experience and the material which is available in a
most unique way through NIMLO," listing the NIMLO source materials,
and adding, "the book is in essence the end result of all this material and
experience. It should give the answers [emphasis supplied] sought by
municipal attorneys on current city legal problems as it is based upon their
interests, inquiries and experience." '
3 p. 700.
4 Pp. 379, 380.
5 P. 497.
6 P. 496.
7 ROGER WILLIAM COOLEY, MUICIPAL CORPORATIONS V (1914).
8 P. vi.
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As might be expected, this responsibility for giving the answers results
in the use of a great many hedging phrases such as: "It has been held,"
"Some courts have held," "What some have considered," "Ordinarily,"
"Generally," and "Though this has been disputed by some." What is worse,
it has led the author into a process of pairing off cases from different
jurisdictions in a way which sometimes mistakes for doctrinal disagreement
simple differences in local legal context. A good example of this is the
following statement from the chapter on "Creation, Alteration, Dissolution": 9
The interpretations have differed as to whether or not annexation can
properly extend to include territory within the boundaries of another
municipality, in the absence of express statutory authority. In some
instances it has been held that a municipal corporation is without power
to annex all or part of another municipal corporation. [author's foot-
note 37] To the contrary, in some cases it has been held that a mu-
nicipality may annex territory of another municipality and even the
whole of the other (usually smaller) municipality [author's footnote 38].
In note 37, five cases are cited: State ex rel. Fridley v. Columbia Heights; 10
Forest Acres v. Siegler; 11 In re Alteration of Lines of Indiana and Shayler
Townships; u West University Place v. Bellaire; 13 and Wauwatosa v.
Milwaukee.'4
In the Fridley case, the court was called upon to interpret the language of
a Minnesota statute providing: 15
When . . . the owner of any tract, piece, or parcel of land abutting
upon any incorporated city having 10,000 inhabitants or less
shall petition the city council to have such property annexed
the city council may by ordinance declare the same to be an addition to
such city
Emphasizing the terms, "tract, piece, or parcel," the court held that the
statute did not authorize the piecemeal annexation of another municipality.
In the Forest Acres case, the statute plainly contemplated annexation of
contiguous municipalities, and the question before the court was whether
or not the words, " . . . whether the adjacent territory be in whole or
in part in incorporated municipality," contemplated the annexation of less
than a whole municipality. The court went behind the code to the session
laws to discover a clerical error and revise the code section to read, ". . .
whether the adjacent territory be in whole or in part an incorporated
municipality," and interpreted the section as revised to preclude piecemeal
annexation of other' municipalities. The Indiana and Shayler Townships
case held simply that under a statute empowering the court of sessions to
(a) alter the boundaries of a township and any adjoining township, bor-
ough, or city so as to suit the convenience of the inhabitants thereof, (b)
cause the lines or boundaries of townships to be ascertained and established,
and (c) ascertain and establish disputed lines and boundaries between two
9P. 36.
10 237 Minn. 124, 53 N.W.2d 831 (1952).
11224 S.C. 166, 77 S.E.2d 900 (1953).
12373 Pa. 319, 95 A.2d 506 (1953).
13 198 S.W.2d 766 (Tex.Civ.App.1946).
14180 Wis. 310, 192 N.W. 982 (1923).
15 MInN.STAT. § 413.14 (1953).
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or more, townships,- or bdtween townships, and cities or boroughs, did ftot
empower such court to effect the annexation of a substantial portion of one
township by another. The West University Place case interpreted the Texas'
constitutional home-rule provision (enabling act) which read, "The power'
to fix the boundary limits of said city, to provide for the extension of said,
boundary limits and annexation of additional territory lying adjacent to,
said city, according to such rules as may be provided by said charter."' 6
The Texas court said that cities and towns of under 5000 population, as well.
as home-rule cities, derived their power from section four of article nine
of the Texas constitution ("They-may assess and collect . . . etc."),
and holding their jurisdiction by virtue of the constitution and general stat-
utes, they could not be abolished and their territory annexed by a home-
rule city acting under its charter. The Wauwatosa case involved a statute
similar to that interpreted in the Fridley case. The Wisconsin court held
that it was to be read together with the detachment statute, which provided
that persons seeking to have their territory detached from an incorporated
community could submit a petition, to the city council of the communipy,J
and before the territory could be detached, three-fourths of the council must
vote in favor of such a detachment.. Reading these two statutes togethe,,
the court held'that the first shouldnot be interpreted in a way which would'
deprive the council of a municipality of the power under the second to
v~to the disconnection of its territory.
Note 38 cites four cases in support of the. proposition that absent special
statutory a:th6rity, one municipality may annex the territory of another.
The first of these is Pence v. Frankfort,"7 a case arising under section
3287 "of the Kentucky statutes, providing, "Whenever it is deemed desirable
to aniix any territory . . . (setting out procedure) . . . If any
city be annexed to another, the city so annexing the territoty of another
shall .be bound by, all debts and liabilities, etc." The court held that the,
statute plainly contemplated the annexation of the territory of one city by
another. The second case cited is State v. Anoka,'8 which is hardly in point.,
It was brought to contest an annexation proceeding had under the same,
statute interpreted in the Fridley case. The court adhered to the interpreta-,
tion. grafted upon it in that case, but held ihat the town of Anoka was an
unincorporated town and that a statute giving it certain limited village,
powers did not make it an incorporated town. Hence, the doctrine of the,
Fridley case was inapplicable and the annexation was permitted. The statu-
tory authority in the third case, Kansas City v. Stegmiller,9 was perfectly.
plain, providing, in part, "Any such city . . . may at any time or
times extend its limits by ordinance, provided that before such city shall
extend its limits so as to include any incorporated city, town or village,
four sevenths of the qualified voters of the included city, town or village
shall vote in favor of the proposition." The fourth, State v. Cincinnati,20
involved an even plainer grant, "That.any city of the first grade of the first,
class shall have the power to annex to its present corporate limits any contig-
16 TEx.REV.CrV.STAT., art. 1175, § 2 (1948).
17 101 Ky. 534, 41 S.E. 1011 (1897).
18 240 Minn. 350, 61 N.W.2d 237 (1953).
19 151 Mo. 189, 52 S.W. 723 (1899).
20 52 Ohio St. 419, 40 N.E. 508 (1895).
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uous municipal corporation or corporations of other grades or classes
This same tendency to overlook the local legal context of decisions and
sort them out in terms of their ultimate result in the case involved is to be
seen in the very next paragraph. There it is stated, that, "some annexation
statutes have been interpreted to permit the extension of municipal bound-
aries into another county, whereas in other states it has been held that this
cannot be done without express statutory authorization." Among the cases
cited as permitting such an annexation is Henrico County v. City of Rich-
mond.2 1 Since Virginia cities are independent political units, not a part
of any county, it is difficult to see what "another" means in the context of
the Henrico County case. In the chapter on taxation, there is another ex-
ample of this comparison of apples and oranges. There it is said that "the
courts" have held that a municipality may impose an inheritance tax,
citing as authority for this assertion Heller v. District of Columbia.22 Cer-
tainly if this statement is taken to mean that there is nothing in the United
States Constitution which would invalidate a municipal inheritance tax as
such, it is true, though the fact that the District of Columbia by act of
Congress can be empowered to levy such a tax hardly establishes its truth.23
A third shortcoming in Mr. Rhyne's volume lies in the absence of careful
editorial work. There are repeated instances in which the citations simply
do not match the text. Thus, on page 669, Kansas City v. Frogge 2 4 appar-
ently should be note 29 and Fallon Florist v. Roanoke 2 5 should be note 30.
On pages 702 and 703, this fault becomes farcical. A rank layman could
guess that the cases cited do not stand for the propositions for which
they are cited. Anyone who can read can determine that Mackall v. Chesa-
peake and Ohio Canal Co.2 6 could not well involve tax exemptions for tele-
vision towers, since the case was decided in 1877. A layman might also
take an inspired guess that Philadelphia v. Overbrook Park Congregation 2 7
and Bethel Pentacostal Tabernacle v. District of Columbia 28 do not involve
the exemption of railroad rights of way, and that Eyers Woolen Co. v. Gil-
sum - does not involve facilities for the storage of oil.
In summary, this reviewer predicts that Municipal Law will prove to be a
useful volume for occasions when the size of the brief case dictates a light
library and where "the answers" are for discussion rather than action. The
wise, however, will be wary.
Jo D SHA LUCAs.
University of Chicago.
21177 Va. 754, 15 S.E.2d 309 (1941).
22 91 U.S.App.D.C. 238, 198 F.2d 983 (1952).
23 In 1908, in the case of WVtheville v. Johnson, 108 Va. 589, 62 S.E. 328 (1908),
the Virginia court held that under a broad general grant of taxing power, the town
of Wytheville could not levy a collateral inheritance tax. Though the reasoning
in the case was pretty effectively deflated in Fallon Florist v. Roanoke, 190 Va. 564,
58 S.E.2d 316 (1950), it raises the problem in the proper context, the extent to which
such taxes can be levied under a general grant of the power to tax.
24 352 Mlo. 233, 176 S.W.2d 498 (1943).
25190 Va. 564, 58 S.E.2d 316 (1950).
26 94 U.S. 308 (1877).
27 171 Pa.Super. 581, 91 A.2d 310 (1952).
28 106 A.2d 143 (D.O.MAun.App.1954)
29 84 N.H. 1, 146 Atl. 511 (1929).
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